tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN May 3, 2014 4:00am-6:01am EDT
one year and the government and russia will have to take into account, and my constituency, and was their first for the elections when there were elections, and they have 14 contenders. you know it's still the naval base for russian strategically. that's for the submarines are and the missiles on submarines when you run the elections in naval base you had to call to me to the office which you can and
at least immediately a probably not any cyber. we have china and different geography. so it was much more difficult than just becoming a member but i have to agree with president that in technical terms, in technical terms your's some choose to release of. basically it problem of russian nonperforming enough. there were consultations with nato because they failed to heed it took me to use tear originally with warren christopher and was my
counterpart in the united states so that he started to concentrate the on the probable aggression even invited as a new member and could not do that and probably cannot know even if it was today a fully democratic country just because of the geography. when he started to address a in 95 it was probably already too late. even more interest in the details of will that read my memoirists in technical terms we
have a lot of promises. tell you, and to promises of have economic in negotiating real problems rather than just a general discussion is even dwarfs the and the threat. >> this trip to the present and ukraine what would you say they impossibly did but. >> this is a serious situation. over to the case and we believe
to of the ukrainian state, country that was stolen. really believe in is serious about the values and principles of international law who we have no other option than to say crumby must be given back. it seems to be unrealistic and we have to find answers to this question. hence, which is one sentence. of course mega-to react in this instance the security reality in your became different. but the most important answer
should be given in another era ahead. >> that may bring in changing. looking at it covering this it does appear other than trying to reassure the article five cover rumors its that there is very hot little nato as an organization can do or is willing to do. greeks i think there for aspects of dealing with this crisis. the on happen to be insulated the first thing, nato has successfully reassured the new members tenths when, but we have a serious article five defense reassurance. have sending 600 troops for
exercise is to increase in the ability to make it clear as was pointed out that we take the offensive wellesz very seriously. who at least we can put limits on how far this crisis can go. will we can do to help ukraine. economically, and governments, corruption, political. everyone needs to do their utmost to improve and mrs. lahood. the weekend clear rule in helping to revitalize, reform and restructuring the canadian armed forces. offhand the first thing to do is
to make it clear russia there are consequences. pressure of the annexation of crimea. it would wait to read through with. we would go back to business. we have seen many interests economic her otherwise. so far the u.s., the european union, the united nations, everybody has shown remarkable consistency ahu and the russian economy is starting to impact. i was fascinated. i was in london yesterday. the entire 44 have been taken over by russian forces because where so many russians living in london, where millions of
russians now living outside russia. the enormous living standards, connected through europe and the united states, the international trading system and a way that the ruble has lost about 10% of its value. came down toward the zero. they openly address the issue to be palette of strength to of the ways that masks a motion, but it's not going to be long before they stop by. the final thing is only a doing in native is keeping the door open. we have not torn up the nato
russia or room declaration. russia is so integrated into your. when the russians talk of nato enlargement is something that is excluded from your. the russians are of the council of europe. and before the crisis there were going to join the economic corporation developed. we are keeping those mechanisms for what it was recalling the future european security open hoping that senator later it would come to their senses and realize they had procured a short term through of nationalist exuberant somehow. >> how the russian president has
asserted the right of pressure to intervene. some of the baltic states. is there any doubt who at the fresh surtout invade or even try to destabilize and is an, one of the minimum restates that an article five mutual defense full for the defense for would be the reaction? >> the problem is a big part of the public opinion those knives into this in. >> they could be sure and we need to keep an unambiguous
>> no harm. the clear answer is no. don't think the u.s. public would support a military response. and talking about if this were to be followed in native states. >> i misunderstood you. of course that would be beamed had the him be the let me say this, i think that as we look at the situation to have surf is important to remind that
demonizing president from gambling as a necessary and terrible, demonizing in imposing sanctions does not amount to a strategy. what we need is a strategy and one alma half for. one priority ahead unless to understand our first priority ought to be in the sure the ukraine can be turned her of fully overtime. it won't happen at the push of a button from what is essentially a dysfunctions the tax and to a prosperous state will require a
lot of money. the eu has already devoted 11 billion. united states may some resources available. his we will need to help ukraine have politically, economically and just the military issue. that's important. a second observation, you know, i don't need to explain to this audience how many times over the last decade or so we have allowed ourselves, i mean americans and europeans to be split in the management of crises. remember iraq. remember libya. i believe so far we can be quite proud that even though there are
differences here and they're both within and between we have managed to keep things together. i believe we would be operating -- offering of victory on a silver platter if he allowed us either within the eu or in the trans-atlantic community to be divided about the response. i mean that only half seriously then do we should say thank you, mr. president, the reminding is that there is a need to have a vibrant and active nato. some people in europe are beginning to think that maybe after afghanistan we don't need this organization that much anymore. thank you, mr. president, for
reminding us that it is a good idea for europe to look at how to diversify our energy sources such. thank you, mr. president, for also reminding us that it is totally essential as an objective for the european union to speak with one voice, not only when things are called bud particularly at times of crises. i believe you have given us enough. i was hoping we would not need this. it gave us up pretty good like a call. >> the question is what kind of wake-up call. the secretary said whatever u.s. defense secretary has been saying since the end of the cold war which is that the european countries have to spend more on defense. instead the opposite is happening. and in this country do you think there will be any change in that dynamic falls apart? >> when i look at this situation
to me like a call should be that what we were pursuing, the pivot or rebalance to my think the situation has only reinforced how important relationships in europe are for the united states in many ways that conservative basis and the foundation for the very turbulent and challenging world reface. and so i think of this in terms not only of military engagement but equally and perhaps even more important at the political, diplomatic level engagement with societies. this has to be a prayer resource prior ready for the united states always sippar. >> it is also a military element. >> of course. among the public, a taste for spending more on common defense, on defense that is part of an integrated nato complement to restructure that is military.
>> to have a chance for that we need to speak very serious. in many countries it is being neglected. let's not expect that it will be convincing to the public opinion to support more spending. and that is why i believe, i agree strategies, it's a matter of wisdom. the we also should understand how important it is to react in the very clear, very familiar know, tough way south to what is and elemental crime and it's not to, you know, demonize the russian president or humiliate russia. they did something, the worst of what can happen in europe.
and we have to be consistent and the political issues. the only way people, unfortunately unfortunately there is a time when we have again to spend more. >> to you see any prospect that anything the west is doing right now would turn him from his current path in eastern ukraine? >> it is not that -- it is not up to us to do these things. very dependent on the west. democratic forces both in the ukraine and russia have to stand up. so the west there was always, as i mentioned the ninth time, the oil price was so low. we had nine the kind of money
they have now. into promises which we have prioritized xbox, our work is counterproductive. >> do you think there's anything now that can be done? >> i agree with the prime minister. if you feel that it was aggression and you call it that way, so the work should mean something. otherwise it is totally counterproductive. they speak of the legal decisions, for instance, of russia's parliamentary in support of what they call aggression now. yet members of russian parliament and will often need
when i come back. they're now coming for their spring vacation. you don't go even to london. you get to miami. you go to new york and you will see those people are members of the parliament. in their own budgets the of 15 and 20 people are somehow selected. i don't challenge this. but what i'm saying, they should be in agreement there should be consistent. if you threaten something you do something. if you don't do, if you have not prepared to deprive yourself which i fully understand. of course there billions of dollars in london, new york, miami, french riviera.
people are waiting now for those people to come. and not speaking of oligarchs. and not speaking of businesses. hamas speaking of the russians i don't have millions of dollars. and speaking of people and actually wanted. they should've been told something consistent if they did something wrong. and you want to introduce sanctions. they should see that it be otherwise they come here, very have communication. they come back. what is the conclusion? the conclusion is that the west is corrupt, probably as corrupt as anything they have back,. there is no consistency. it is in to work, and into words are corrupt the more than empty promises and no less than absolute power.
those two things was corrupt. so i'm not arguing for prohibiting those people to come necessarily, but that would, of course, be very painful. people next time mike remember. next time now but probably think twice whether i should vote for something or i should go to miami to my villa. the choice is not bad. you have to keep your opinion and find different words. i mean, russia at least and ukraine today particularly because the blood is spilled their more in the ukraine and fortunately because i saw the yugoslavian. also, with milosevic with corporations. so that was unfortunate for it.
basically the west and the united states and germ anyway, if they are on -- you are on the right side of the history, i tend to agree and it's our problem that we cannot cope with the modern world. the russian problem. but in -- you might call it technical terms or in day withs day term -- day-by-day terms there should be more responsibility and consistency in the west. not necessarily do something but if you are not prepared to do, don't say you are. >> we haven't solved the ukraine issue. but i want to move on to something that the ambassador put on the table, which is that if we want to get to audience questions -- as -- what does this mean? this a really fundamental term or shift in the relationship of
nato with russia? are we going to say this is one of those hinge points? >> well, the -- depend on what russia does. it takes to to tango, obviously, but from any point of view, is a said before, we don't want to close doors. we kept the nato council operational and still want to cooperate with russia as soon as we can men circumstances allow and dealing with all the oglobal challenges hike afghanistan or counterterrorism where we're constanting with-dos you're talking about to departmentalizing -- >> the point i'm trike to make here in the start run we have no -- short run we have no choice but to face the challenge. so, yes in the short term, deterrence and reassurance, if you like, defense of europe,
that has to be the authority. but we are mindful here at nato that the world is not going to stop because of the ukraine problems. we don't have, if you like, any less chaos in syria or problems in the middle east, terrorism spreading across north africa, these things are still with us, so, yes, we have to deal with this issue of reassurance to the baltic states and we still have to work with our partners -- >> prime minister, prime minister, what would you -- >> carry on as well. so we have to be a security organization, which is big enough and grown up enough as with several problems at once. >> what too you think, mr. prime minister, this means in terms of where nato goes from here and dealing with russia? >> we -- >> we didn't solve or come up with a solution to ukraine.
>> afraid we not go beyond the decision -- we already taken by nato, and there's no good answer without finding out, what i said before. we cannot simply neglect. we cannot forget about the fact that already took -- and this is very misfortunate. i generally need in the need to work together closely with russia. that we share a lot of common interests, and i believe that the present russian policy is suicidal, against the interests of russia, and i would like to overcome that situation. but unfortunately, there are some conditions that must be done by them. they have to get out of ukraine. have to stop interfering with domestic affairs of other
countries. you should not forget that in europe we have elaborated regular layings, procedures, guaranteeing the rights of minorities in council of european and so on. russia has -- should good to european institutions in russian speaking minorities, et cetera. but as i said, we cannot accept the actual situation in ukraine and i do not know what is the solution for that, because mr. putin announce historical new doctrine and it's sending back will -- stepping back will me failure, and -- also to address ordinary russians, to make something to change the chauvinistic view by the
population. they should understand at it always ended in total catastrophe of the states and the nations. >> you wanted to jump in here. >> i think we have in historical precedent. you look back in terms of periods of tension between nato and russia and it was most serious during the conflict in former ewing slav ya and during the -- yugoslavia and during the russian-georgia war. there were discussions all over the capitals in europe and the united states and russia, that we may have got -- returned to a cold war or be returning to another cold war. we managed to move past those periods because of a vast array of critical shared security interests. ukraine is more serious. this is more difficult situation. the stakes for russia, for one thing-are much greater in the ukrainian case. but i'm hopeful and when i hear jamie shea say we need to pursue
this consult tatetive bodies and the nato-russia council to engage and work through these problems with russia. russia's position in europe and global security is critical. i think they are major power, and it's important that we understand some of the other major strategic issues that are at stake in this relationship, in arms control in counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, the future of the circumstances in the middle east and the continued outcome from the revolutions taking place in that area, and if we have the united states, europe, and russia, working in a competitive or enemy sort of approach in dealing with those situations, i think it could be very grim for the future. so. it's worth trying. it won't be easy. we should expect setbacks but we have to keep, i think, long-term vision and not look at this in's just in terms of short term and immediate. i don't think it's in interest
of our nations to see the return of the colored war. >> i'm not hearing anyone would use the term containment. i'm hearing elements of that. for instance, that europe should diversify its energy sources. that ways be found to not need russia so much. what would you say to that, ambassador? do you think something fundamental is happening here? i say this with no disrespect, another georgia situation where after a year or so we look the other way and move on. it's just not top of -- >> maybe we didn't take events in georgia seriously enough. but that is a question also for historians to take a look at. my own view is that what we are seeing is a policy of revisionism. that is what you call that.
placing in question what is. essentially i learned that there are two kinds of leaders. in the world. so, there's one category of leaders that takes what is and tries to create a better future. good example of that is yu of singapore. if german leaders postwar had behaved or were behaving now in the way the current russian leadership is behaving, we would still be fighting with poland, we would be fighting with france, and we would claim that some polls who speak german are actually germans and do deserve the protection of the mayoran armed forces if something happens in poland we don't like. i mean, this is chaos. this is awful.
so i'm not one who is going to try to minimize the dimensions of the problem that we're facing. but i also totally agree with kozarov, i hope everybody listens hundred he speaks about how important consistency is. consistency is very close to credibility, and whatever we say has got to match with what we do. i totally agree with you. i think, in response to your question, what about nato? well, we are going to need to take a fresh look at how important the core function of nato is to our countries. the core function in the collective defense has gotten more or less forgotten a little bit because we thought it was no longer really necessary. we used to say germany was surrounded by friends and
everything is wonderful. obviously we need to take a fresh look because o'land is our immediate neighbor, part of our club, our union, and pole -- pollland has a bored irwith ukraine and if there's chaos in ukraine and beyond it affects our very own security and that of all of nate at the and the i as well. so, yes, i think there must be a comprehensive review of our priorities, both in the e.u. and in nato, but let's not do it, if i may say so with foaming at the mouth. let's do it cool, and let's do it also, always, in -- with having in mind consistency. >> on that thought we're going to questions from the audience. if you just briefly give your name and affiliation. you know the rule, a question, not a statement. >> thank you. from george washington
university. we talked about in april of 2008 the nato summit decided to not extend membership action to ukraine and georgia, and within four months georgia was invaded. with hindsight, the word wisdom has been subpoena number of times today. is it your view that things in -- not to extend protection to ukraine and georgia unwise? >> just to get to all the questions does one want to volunteer to take that -- we lost jimmy shea. i'm sorry. they're replacing the call. but -- well -- >> i'll take that. i can take that question. >> actually, jamie shea, tide you hear the question?
>> i did. and i -- i did, yes. >> i'm going to ask everyone to give a brief answer because we have a lot of hands up. was it a mistake not to take in georgia and ukraine in 2008? >> well, no. again, you can't take in countries that are not ready for membership and georgia and ukraine were then and still now still in preparation for membership, and that work continues. what nato has not done in the wake of the crisis is, first of all, lift the offer to georgia on ultimate nato membership if georgia meets can bees. but you're putting ukraine and georgia together is wrong. ukraine is not seeking nato membership, even in the present crisis, it has not renewedy for nato. russians were talking about nato as actually seeking to have ukraine as a member.
that's not the case. we're working with georgia but this is a deliberate process in preparation that has to go through. no. i don't believe that the nato decision was the reason. unless russians at the time, president putin, but -- some kind of alibi or justification or some kind of smoke screen to simply carry out -- which were already there. it's a very -- it's a good excuse but whether that's the real strategic motivation i have my doubts. >> right here, sir in the red and blue tie. >> thank you. i'm benjamin, a retired american diplomat. my question goes to ambassador's opening remarks in which he talked about the dire consequences of not having had nato expansion. it seems to me that that
suggests a lack of confidence in the ability of the west to muster sufficient economic assistance and investments to integrate and develop economies of eastern europe with the countries of the former soviet union. that seems to me the real tragedy. wouldn't you agree? and your emphasis on massive economic assistants for ukraine now, means that we learned the lesson, but perhaps a bit late. thank you. >> do you want to comment on that? >> i can give very brief. yes, i would tend to agree with you, and mind you, i don't speak on behalf of the german government here. don't -- i don't want to be misunderstood. i speak as a private citizen. i believe we did not pay enough
attention to, also financially and economically, to the challenges of our eastern neighbors. we should have probably acted long before russia started to think about crimea or long before the maidan began to explode about how to help stabilize a country that has had a history now for two decades of not really making its way forward as we were hoping to. what was the other part of the question? >> i think -- [inaudible] >> okay, i think -- >> so, the gentleman in the blue sweater. >> the question is on the 25th 25th of may, we will have the european election. on the second day ukraine are supposed to have the
referendum -- >> and presidential election. >> how do you think we could help them just to have free elections in all of ukraine with this situation? >> if i may. >> ey. >> believe we can do very little about eastern ukraine because, of course, the security situation will decide about the possibility to have any kind of elections there or not. in my opinion one of the targets of intervention, not to have elections at all, than to have the kind of pretext to question the results of elections in general. but in the rest of ukraine, there would be a lot of observers from european institutions, and they can
expect fair elections. >> yes, right here, the gentleman and then the lady behind him. >> hi, i'm iris committees on eastern europe and russia and nato. minister, when you first became foreign minister of the russian soviet federated social socialip lick, you laid out your plan so if the soviet union were unfortunately to break up you would prevent it from becoming a nuclear yugoslavia and i was stunned that you could imagine to achieve peace in such conditions, and i was more stunned you did achieve it. i think the entire world and the russian people owe you a great debt of gratitude for that
achievement and you are not as honored as you well-deserve and history should note your important role, especially now when mr. putin is beginning to assume the role of the milosevic and undo the tremendous work you did for your people. that's not my question but die think you deserve that honor and appreciation. my question is about the lack of connected with words you brought up. mr. gorbachev when he was still president was discussing the unification of germany, and i'm not going to talk bet myth we promised nato would never move east, and ambassador matlock already refutessed that. it's a high. but gorbachev raced the notion should they become part of nato and the was pooh-poohed. and then james baker later regretted that and said he should not have done that. he should have engaged gorbachev on that question. one of the first acts of the yeltsin government in
december 1991 was to raise the question of nato membership. the foreign ministry later said it was a mistranslation but foreign ministry officials assured me at it was a true traps layings. they had to withdraw because it became a political embarrassment for yeltsin and you permanently. i wonder how much damage has bun done with our lack of -- with russia. >> first of all, i cannot agree more on your statement. thank you so much. [laughter] >> and secondly, i agree with the assumption of your question, yes. that's where i technically agree and cede the point of president putin when he says that we had
-- what was it -- unclear. i would put it in a way, if you read my message, somebody publishes my memoirs, you'll find it -- i am pro western in terms i want russia to become a western democracy, not only russian lead going to london or miami, but in -- as a diplomat and practitioner, i met with a lot of confusing signals from nato all the time, and even prime minister said, that's very interesting. the prime minister said they believe that partnership for peace was instead of membership. if they believed that in poland how much in russia in kremlin, are especially hardliners,
tended to believe it when so-called declaration was signed by my successor, who was, of course, old kgb hand, and still is, and he -- i mean, by that time everything was lost. every opportunity. the window was closed. for the west. but he believed that when he signed this fig leaf declaration of nato-russian partnershippin' 1997, 1998, which nato applauded for, he actually came home and said publicly that they promised him that under the declaration was the promise of nato not to expand to former soviet space. that is baltic states. so, president putin, who still
has him as his advisor, he tended to believe that he was deceived by the declaration. there is no -- we could not find any record of any promises to gorbachev that nato would not expand, for instance to eastern germany. we could not find -- member somebody find it but we have no record. we had no record of that. but gorbachev apparently seems to believe still today that he had such a promise, and president yeltsin believed he had the promise and they detail how he was led to believe that, that partnership for peace was instead of nato-not a first step, which i knew because delbert and christopher and my
western european colleagues, spent time to explain that to me. while they failed to tell that to president putin -- to president yeltsin at that time. that brings me back to my point. it's not enough for the west to be on the right side of history. it's important, but they should speak in clear terms. that's what russians deserve. that's what putin deserves. that is what russian parliament deserves. that's what ukrainian people in particular today because they are suffering. they are in the war. so, they deserve very, very clear message and the message which needs to end because
somebody whispers something to somebody, you know? somebody behinds that, yes, we don't go very far in giving protection from whatever there is sub sub versesive operations and the event does not happen, that might spell in blood because people start fighting, believing there is somebody behind them like those so-called pro-russian militia, they are fighting there believing that the red army stands ready on the border, which is probably true. so, i tend to believe it's true. so, that is one thing. the other thing, if you promise something to people and you fail, better not promise. they will do themselves. i'm pretty sure that russian people haven't said its final
word yet. there will be a democratic revolution or continuation of democratic process in russia sooner or later. maybe after the old -- good a little bit down because petro dollars can buy everything including former chancellors. >> i think we have time -- >> so, we will do it ourselves but don't deceive people. >> i think we have time -- i was good together say for one but let's take two if you boast ask your question and get the panel to address them. so the young lady there and the woman here in blue. >> i imlaura. my question is, in light of the ukraine crisis it has pointed to the weakness in the security plan of the west and of nato and it also indicated that russia still has influence in many of the countries in the caucus
caucuses and eastern europe. so what should nato do to ensure the -- ensure and reinforce the territoryat integrity of countries like ukraine and georgia who have proven they are in fact nato allies. >> and the second question as well. >> apparently russia has called for u.n. security council meeting today to discuss ukraine. me question is very simple. what can they hope togyn from this move? apparently the u.s. doesn't support it. >> who would like to tackle these two questions first? jamie? >> yes. on the first question, we have to be clear, when it comes to military -- the security guard, the article 5 republic of nato, which is why countries join nato in order to have that. so ukraine is not a nato ally.
it's true it's a partner and very close partner and in fact participated in nearly -- in fact all of natos operations, including afghan, and therefore we're treating the partnership seriously. in answer to a previous question we have teams at the moment in ukraine, helping with defense reform, defense prestructuring, with reform of the television services and all of the things was pointing to that we need to do to help make ukraine a more resilient straight. a very strong culture with georgia. and we're helping moldova, operating real estates with -- so those partners are receiving assistance from nato but we have to be clear the article v extends only to nato allies, and that is what we're doing when it comes to reassure of packages. russia also has to play arole in
reassuring the countrieses of central and eastern europe and just coming back to what was said a moment ago, if i may very briefly because this is my last intervention. used to threaten these countries with -- regarding to the consequences of nato membership and there sovereign si in terms of what they were able to do that russia had a say in security affairs, drove them into the arms of nato and the more they became worried, became more determined to seek nato membership. so if russia wants to stay the in the neighborhood it has to see it in terms of either you are a vessel or enemy, it had to have a modern approach to security, and that's not what president putin is doing. >> ambassador. >> just very briefly. as a footnote to jamie's reply, in my view, what russia has been doing in recent days and weeks is not really a demonstration of
russian strength. it is more to me a demonstration of russian weakness. think for a moment what russia has already lost. colassal lost. loss of trust by all its neighbors. if president putin believes that this is the way for him to build the eurasian union of which he dreams, well, good luck. i imagine that president al leave